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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade, a new idea challenging the 
classical self-non-self viewpoint has become 
popular amongst immunologists. It is called the 
Danger Theory. In this conceptual paper, we 
look at this theory from the perspective of 
Artificial Immune System practitioners. An 
overview of the Danger Theory is presented with 
particular emphasis on analogies in the Artificial 
Immune Systems world. A number of potential 
application areas are then used to provide a 
framing for a critical assessment of the concept, 
and its relevance for Artificial Immune Systems. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, a new theory has become popular 
amongst immunologists. It is called the Danger Theory, 
and its chief advocate is Matzinger [18], [19] and [20]. A 
number of advantages are claimed for this theory; not 
least that it provides a method of ‘grounding’ the immune 
response. The theory is not complete, and there are some 
doubts about how much it actually changes behaviour and 
/ or structure. Nevertheless, the theory contains enough 
potentially interesting ideas to make it worth assessing its 
relevance to Artificial Immune Systems. 
It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this 
theory, which is still controversial [21]. Rather we are 
interested in its merits for Artificial Immune System 
applications and hence its actual existence in the humoral 
immune system is of little importance to us. Our question 
is: Can it help us build better Artificial Immune Systems? 
Few other Artificial Immune System practitioners are 
aware of the Danger Theory, notable exceptions being 
Burgess [5] and Willamson [22]. Hence, this is the first 
paper that deals directly with the Danger Theory, and it is 
the authors’ intention that this paper stimulates discussion 
in our research community. 
In the next section, we provide an overview of the Danger 
Theory, pointing out, where appropriate, some analogies 
in current Artificial Immune System models. We then 
assess the relevance of the theory for Artificial Immune 
System security applications, which is probably the most 
obvious application area for the danger model. Other 
Artificial Immune System application areas are also 
considered. Finally, we draw some preliminary 
conclusions about the potential of the Danger concept. 
2 THE DANGER THEORY 
The immune system is commonly thought to work at 
three levels: External barriers (skin, mucus), innate 
immunity and the acquired or adaptive immune system. 
As part of the third and most complex level, B-
Lymphocytes secrete specific antibodies that recognise 
and react to stimuli. It is this pattern matching between 
antibodies and antigens that lies at the heart of most 
Artificial Immune System implementations. Another type 
of cell, the T (killer) lymphocyte, is also important in 
different types of immune reactions. Although not usually 
present in Artificial Immune System models, the 
behaviour of this cell is implicated in the Danger model 
and so it is included here. From the Artificial Immune 
System practitioner’s point of view, the T killer cells 
match stimuli in much the same way as antibodies do. 
However, it is not simply a question of matching in the 
humoral immune system. It is fundamental that only the 
‘correct’ cells are matched as otherwise this could lead to 
a self-destructive autoimmune reaction. Classical 
immunology [12] stipulates that an immune response is 
triggered when the body encounters something non-self or 
foreign. It is not yet fully understood how this self-non-
self discrimination is achieved, but many immunologists 
believe that the difference between them is learnt early in 
life. In particular it is thought that the maturation process 
plays an important role to achieve self-tolerance by 
eliminating those T and B cells that react to self. In 
addition, a ‘confirmation’ signal is required; that is, for 
either B cell or T (killer) cell activation, a T (helper) 
lymphocyte must also be activated. This dual activation is 
further protection against the chance of accidentally 
reacting to self. 
Matzinger’s Danger Theory debates this point of view 
(for a good introduction, see Matzinger [18]). Technical 
overviews can be found in Matzinger [19] and Matzinger 
[20]. She points out that there must be discrimination 
happening that goes beyond the self-non-self distinction 
described above. For instance: 
• There is no immune reaction to foreign bacteria in the 
gut or to the food we eat although both are foreign 
entities. 
• Conversely, some auto-reactive processes are useful, 
for example against self molecules expressed by 
stressed cells. 
• The definition of self is problematic – realistically, 
self is confined to the subset actually seen by the 
lymphocytes during maturation. 
• The human body changes over its lifetime and thus 
self changes as well. Therefore, the question arises 
whether defences against non-self learned early in 
life might be autoreactive later. 
• Other aspects that seem to be at odds with the 
traditional viewpoint are autoimmune diseases and 
certain types of tumours that are fought by the 
immune system (both attacks against self) and 
successful transplants (no attack against non-self). 
Matzinger concludes that the immune system actually 
discriminates “some self from some non-self”. She asserts 
that the Danger Theory introduces not just new labels, but 
a way of escaping the semantic difficulties with self and 
non-self, and thus provides grounding for the immune 
response. If we accept the Danger Theory as valid we can 
take care of ‘non-self but harmless’ and of ‘self but 
harmful’ invaders into our system. To see how this is 
possible, we will have to examine the theory in more 
detail. 
The central idea in the Danger Theory is that the immune 
system does not respond to non-self but to danger. Thus, 
just like the self-non-self theories, it fundamentally 
supports the need for discrimination. However, it differs 
in the answer to what should be responded to. Instead of 
responding to foreignness, the immune system reacts to 
danger. 
This theory is borne out of the observation that there is no 
need to attack everything that is foreign, something that 
seems to be supported by the counter examples above. In 
this theory, danger is measured by damage to cells 
indicated by distress signals that are sent out when cells 
die an unnatural death (cell stress or lytic cell death, as 
opposed to programmed cell death, or apoptosis). 
Figure 1 depicts how we might picture an immune 
response according to the Danger Theory. A cell that is in 
distress sends out an alarm signal, whereupon antigens in 
the neighbourhood are captured by antigen-presenting 
cells such as macrophages, which then travel to the local 
lymph node and present the antigens to lymphocytes. 
Essentially, the danger signal establishes a danger zone 
around itself. Thus B cells producing antibodies that 
match antigens within the danger zone get stimulated and 
undergo the clonal expansion process. Those that do not 
match or are too far away do not get stimulated.
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Figure 1: Danger Theory Model. 
Matzinger admits that the exact nature of the danger 
signal is unclear. It may be a ‘positive’ signal (for 
example heat shock protein release) or a ‘negative’ signal 
(for example lack of synaptic contact with a dendritic 
antigen-presenting cell). This is where the Danger Theory 
shares some of the problems associated with traditional 
self-non-self discrimination (i.e. how to discriminate 
danger from non-danger). However, in this case, the 
signal is grounded rather than being some abstract 
representation of danger. 
Another way of looking at the danger model is to see it as 
an extension of the Two-Signal model by Bretscher and 
Cohn [4]. In this model, the two signals are antigen 
recognition (signal one) and co-stimulation (signal two). 
Co-stimulation is a signal that means “this antigen really 
is foreign” or, in the Danger Theory, “this antigen really 
is dangerous”. How the signal arises will be explained 
later. The Danger Theory then operates by applying three 
laws to lymphocyte behaviour (the laws of lymphotics 
[20]): 
• Law 1. Become activated if you receive signals one 
and two together. Die if you receive signal one in the 
absence of signal two. Ignore signal two without 
signal one. 
• Law 2. Accept signal two from antigen-presenting 
cells only (or, for B cells, from T helper cells). B 
cells can act as antigen-presenting cells only for 
experienced (memory) T cells. Note that signal one 
can come from any cells, not just antigen-presenting 
cells. 
• Law 3. After activation (activated cells do not need 
signal two) revert to resting state after a short time. 
For the mature lymphocyte, (whether virgin or 
experienced) these rules are adhered to. However, there 
are two exceptions in the lymphocyte lifecycle. Firstly, 
immature cells are unable to accept signal two from any 
source. This enables an initial negative selection 
screening to occur. Secondly, activated (effector) cells 
respond only to signal one (ignoring signal two), but 
revert to the resting state shortly afterwards. 
An implication of this theory is that autoreactive effects 
are not necessarily harmful, and are in fact expected 
during an infection. This is because any lymphocyte 
reacting to an antigen in the ‘danger zone’ will be 
activated. These antigens are not necessarily the culprits 
for the danger signal. If they are, then the reacting 
lymphocytes will continue to be restimulated until the 
antigens (and therefore the danger signal) are removed. 
After this, they will rest, receiving neither signal one nor 
signal two. 
On the other hand, lymphocytes reacting to innocuous 
(self) antigens will continue to receive signal one from 
these antigens, even after the danger (and therefore signal 
two) has vanished. Therefore these lymphocytes will be 
deleted, and tolerance will be achieved. However, further 
autoreactive effects can be expected, partly because ‘self’ 
changes over time, and partly because of new lymphocyte 
generation (particularly B cells, which produce 
hypermutated clones during activation). 
A problem is posed by the antigen-presenting cell itself, 
whose (innocuous) antigens are by definition always in 
the danger zone. Lymphocytes reacting to these antigens 
might destroy the antigen-presenting cell and thus 
interfere with the immune response. The negative 
selection of immature lymphocytes protects against this 
possibility. 
Figure 2 shows a more detailed picture of how the Danger 
Theory can be viewed as an extension of immune signals. 
These diagrams are adapted from those presented in 
Matzinger [19] except for the sixth, which incorporates 
suggestions made in Matzinger [20]. 
In the original view of the world by Burnet [6], only 
signal one is considered. This is shown in the first 
diagram, where the only signal shown is that between 
infectious agents and lymphocytes (B cells, marked B, 
and T killer, marked Tk). Signal two (second diagram) 
was introduced by Bretscher and Cohn [4]. This helper 
signal comes from a T helper cell (marked Th), on receipt 
of signal one from the B cell. That is, the B cell presents 
antigens to the T helper cell and awaits the T cell’s 
confirmation signal. If the T cell recognises the antigen 
(which, if negative selection has worked, should mean the 
antigen is non-self) then the immune response can 
commence. It was Lafferty and Cuningham [17] who 
proposed that the T helper cells themselves also need to 
be ‘switched on’ by signals one and two, both from 
antigen-presenting cells. This process is depicted in the 
third diagram. 
Note that the T helper cell gets signal one from two 
sources – the B cell and the antigen-presenting cell. In the 
former case the antigens are not chosen randomly – the 
very opposite, since B cells are highly selective for a 
range of (hopefully non-self) antigens. In the latter case, 
the antigens are chosen randomly (the antigen-presenting 
cell simply presents any antigen it picks up) but signal 
two should only be provided to the T helper cell for non-
self antigens. It is not necessarily clear how the antigen-
presenting cell ‘knows’ the antigen is non-self. Janeway 
[14] introduced the idea of infectious non-self (for 
example bacteria), which ‘primes’ antigen presenting 
cells, i.e. causing signal two to be produced (fourth 
diagram). This priming signal is labelled as signal 0 in the 
figures. 
Matzinger proposes to allow priming of antigen-
presenting cells by a danger signal (fifth diagram). She 
also proposes to extend the efficacy of T helper cells by 
routing signal two through antigen presenting cells [20]. 
We have marked this as ‘signal 3’ in the sixth diagram 
(although Matzinger does not use that term, the intention 
is clear). In Matzinger’s words “the antigen seen by the 
killer need not be the same as the helper; the only 
requirement is that they must both be presented by the 
same antigen-presenting cell”. This arrangement allows T 
helper cells to prime many more T killer cells than they 
would otherwise have been able to. 
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Figure 2: Danger Theory viewed as immune signals. 
 
The Danger Theory is not without its limitations. As 
mentioned, the exact nature of the danger signal is still 
unclear. Also, there is sometimes danger that should not 
be responded to (cuts, transplants). In fact, in the case of 
transplants it is often necessary to remove the antigen-
presenting cells from the transplanted organ. Finally, the 
fact that autoimmune diseases do still, if rarely, happen, 
has yet to be fully reconciled with the Danger Theory. 
3 THE DANGER THEORY AND SOME 
ANALOGIES TO ARTIFICIAL 
IMMUNE SYSTEMS 
Danger theory clearly has many facets and intricacies, and 
we have touched on only a few. It might be instructive to 
list a number of considerations for an Artificial Immune 
System practitioner regarding the suitability of the danger 
model for their application. The basic consideration is 
whether negative selection is important. If so, then these 
points may be relevant: 
• Negative selection is bound to be imperfect, and 
therefore autoreactions (false positives) are 
inevitable.  
• The self/non-self boundary is blurred since self and 
non-self antigens often share common regions.   
• Self changes over time. Therefore, one can expect 
problems with memory cells, which later turn out to 
be inaccurate or even autoreactive. 
If these points are sufficient to make a practitioner 
consider incorporating the Danger theory into their model, 
then the following considerations may be instructive: 
1. A danger model requires an antigen-presenting cell, 
which can present an appropriate danger signal. 
2. ‘Danger’ is an emotive term. The signal may have 
nothing to do with danger (see, for example, our 
discussion on data mining applications in section 5). 
3. The appropriate danger signal can be positive 
(presence of signal) or negative (absence). 
4. The danger zone in biology is spatial. In Artificial 
Immune System applications, some other measure of 
proximity (for instance temporal) may be used. 
5. If there is an analogue of an immune response, it 
should not lead to further danger signals. In biology, 
killer cells cause a normal cell death, not danger. 
6. Matzinger proposes priming killer cells via antigen-
presenting cells for greater effect. Depending on the 
immune system used (it only makes sense for 
spatially distributed models) this proposal may be 
relevant. 
7. There are a variety of considerations that are less 
directly related to the danger model. For example, 
migration – how many antibodies receive signal 
one/two from a given antigen-presenting cell? In 
addition, the danger theory relies on concentrations, 
i.e. continuous not binary matching. 
There are also a couple of points that might tempt a 
practitioner to alter the danger model as presented here. 
For example, the danger model has quite a number of 
elements. Given that the antigen-presenting cell mediates 
the danger signal, we might be able to simplify the model 
– for example, do we still need a T helper cell? In 
addition, there are some danger signals that might in some 
sense be ‘appropriate’ and thus should not trigger an 
immune response. In such cases, a method for avoiding 
the danger pathway must be found. A biological example 
is transplanted organs, in which antigen-presenting cells 
are removed. 
4 THE DANGER THEORY AND 
ANOMALY DETECTION 
An intriguing area for the application of Artificial 
Immune Systems is the detection of anomalies such as 
computer viruses, fraudulent transactions or hardware 
faults. The underlying metaphor seems to fit particularly 
nicely here, as there is a system (self) that has to be 
protected against intruders (non-self). Thus if natural 
immune systems have enabled biological species to 
survive, can we not create Artificial Immune Systems to 
do the same to our computers, machines etc? Presumably 
those systems would then have the same beneficial 
properties as natural immune systems like error tolerance, 
distribution, adaptation and self-monitoring. A recent 
overview of biologically inspired approaches to this area 
can be found in Williamson [22]. 
In this section we will present indicative examples of such 
artificial systems, explain their current shortcomings and 
show how the Danger Theory might help overcome some 
of these. 
One of the first such approaches is presented by Forrest et 
al [11] and extended by Hofmeyr and Forrest [13]. This 
work is concerned with building an Artificial Immune 
System that is able to detect non-self in the area of 
network security where non-self is defined as an 
undesired connection. All connections are modelled as 
binary strings and there is a set of known good and bad 
connections, which is used to train and evaluate the 
algorithm. To build the Artificial Immune System, 
random binary strings are created called detectors. 
These detectors then undergo a maturation phase where 
they are presented with good, i.e. self, connections. If they 
match any of these they are eliminated otherwise they 
become mature, but not activated. If during their further 
lifetime these mature detectors match anything else, 
exceeding a certain threshold value, they become 
activated. This is then reported to a human operator who 
decides whether there is a true anomaly. If so the 
detectors are promoted to memory detectors with an 
indefinite life span and minimum activation threshold. 
Thus, this is similar to the secondary response in the 
natural immune system, for instance after immunisation. 
An approach such as the above is known in Artificial 
Immune Systems as negative selection as only those 
detectors (antibodies) that do not match live on. It is 
thought that T cells mature in similar fashion in the 
thymus such that only those survive and mature that do 
not match any self cells after a certain amount of time. 
An alternative approach to negative selection is that of 
positive selection as used for instance by Forrest et al [9] 
and by Somayaji and Forrest [22]. These systems are a 
reversal of the negative selection algorithm described 
above with the difference that detectors for self are 
evolved. From a performance point of view there are 
advantages and disadvantages for both methods. A 
suspect non-self string would have to be compared with 
all self-detectors to establish that it is non-self, whilst with 
negative selection the first matching detector would stop 
the comparison. On the other hand, for a self-string this is 
reversed giving positive selection the upper hand. Thus, 
performance depends on the self to non-self ratio, which 
should generally favour positive selection. 
However, there is another difference between the two 
approaches: the nature of false alarms. With negative 
selection inadequate detectors will result in false 
negatives (missed intrusions) whilst with positive 
selection there will be false positives (false alarms). The 
preference between the two in this case is likely to be 
problem specific. 
Both approaches have been extended further [10] 
including better co-stimulation methods and activation 
thresholds to reduce the number of false alarms, multiple 
antibody sub-populations for improved diversity and 
coverage and improved partial matching rules. Recently, 
similar approaches have also been used to detect hardware 
faults (Bradley and Tyrrell [1]), network intrusion (Kim 
and Bentley [16]) and fault tolerance (Burgess [5]). 
What are the remaining challenges for a successful use of 
Artificial Immune Systems for anomaly detection? 
Firstly, self and non-self will usually evolve and change 
during the lifetime of the system. Hence, to be effective, 
any system used must be robust and flexible enough to 
cope with changing circumstances. Based on the 
performance of their natural counterparts, Artificial 
Immune Systems should be well suited to provide these 
qualities. Secondly, appropriate representations of self 
and good matching rules have to be developed. Most 
research so far has been concentrated in these two areas 
and good advances have been made so far [8]. 
However, as pointed out by Kim and Bentley [15], scaling 
is a problem with negative selection. As the systems to be 
protected grow larger and larger so does self and non-self 
and it becomes more and more problematic to find a set of 
detectors that provides adequate coverage whilst being 
computationally efficient. It is inefficient, if not 
impossible, to map the entire non-self universe, 
particularly as it will be changing over time. The same 
applies to positive selection and trying to map all of self. 
Moreover, the approaches so far have another 
disadvantage: A response requires infection beyond a 
certain threshold and human intervention confirming this. 
Although one might argue that the operator sees fewer 
alarms than in an unaided system, this clearly is not yet 
the ideal situation of an autonomous system preventing all 
damage. Apart from the resource implication of a human 
component, an unduly long delay might be caused by this 
necessity prolonging the time the system is exposed. This 
situation might be further aggravated by the fact that the 
labels self and non-self are often ambiguous and expert 
knowledge might be required to apply them correctly. 
How can these problems be overcome? We believe that 
applying ideas from the Danger Theory can help building 
better Artificial Immune Systems by providing a different 
way of grounding and removing the necessity to map self 
or non-self. To achieve this self-non-self discrimination 
will still be useful but it is no longer essential. This is 
because non-self no longer causes an immune response. 
Instead, it will be danger signals that trigger a reaction. 
What could such danger signals be? They should show up 
after limited infection to minimise damage and hence 
have to be quickly and automatically measurable. Suitable 
signals could include: 
• Too low or too high memory usage. 
• Inappropriate disk activity. 
• Unexpected frequency of file changes as measured 
for example by checksums or file size. 
• SIGABRT signal from abnormally terminated UNIX 
processes. 
• Presence of non-self. 
Of course, it would also be possible to use ‘positive’ 
signals, as discussed in the previous section, such as the 
absence of some normal ‘health’ signals. 
Once the danger signal has been transmitted, the immune 
system can then react to those antigens, for example, 
executables or connections, which are ‘near’ the emitter 
of the danger signal. Note that ‘near’ does not necessarily 
mean geographical or physical closeness, something that 
might make sense for connections and their IP addresses 
but probably not for computer executables in general. In 
essence, the physical ‘near’ that the Danger Theory 
requires for the immune system is a proxy measure for 
causality. Hence, we can substitute it with more 
appropriate causality measures such as similar execution 
start times, concurrent runtimes or access of the same 
resources. 
Consequently, those antibodies or detectors that match 
(first signal) those antigens within a radius, defined by a 
measure such as the above (second signal), will 
proliferate. Having thereby identified the dangerous 
components, further confirmation could then be sought by 
sending it to a special part of the system simulating 
another attack. This would have the further advantage of 
not having to send all detectors to confirm danger. In 
conclusion, using these ideas from the Danger Theory has 
provided a better grounding of danger labels in 
comparison to self / non-self, whilst at the same time 
relying less on human competence. 
5 THE DANGER THEORY AND OTHER 
ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM 
APPLICATIONS 
It is not immediately obvious how the Danger Theory 
could be of use to data mining problems such as the 
movie prediction problem described in Cayzer and 
Aickelin [7], because the notions of self and non-self are 
not used. In essence, in data mining all of the system is 
self. More precisely, it is not an issue what is self or non-
self as the designer of the database has complete control 
over this aspect. 
However, if the labels self and non-self were to be 
replaced by interesting and non-interesting data for 
example, a distinction would prove beneficial. In this 
case, the immune system is being applied as a classifier. If 
one can then further assume that interesting data is 
located ‘close’ or ‘near’ to other interesting data, ideas 
from the Danger Theory can come into play again. To do 
so, it is necessary to define ‘close’ / ‘near’. We could use: 
• Physical closeness, for instance distance in the 
database as measured by an appropriate metric. 
• Correlation of data, as measured by statistical tools. 
• Similar entry times into the database. 
• File size. 
A danger signal could thus be interpreted as a valuable 
piece of information that has been uncovered. Hence, 
those antibodies are stimulated that match data that is 
‘close’ this valuable piece of information. 
Taking this idea further, we might define the danger 
signal as an indication of user interest. Given this 
definition, we can speculate about various scenarios in 
which the danger signal could be of use. One such 
scenario is outlined below for illustrative purposes. 
Imagine a user browsing a set of documents. Each 
document has a set of features (for instance keywords, 
title, author, date etc). Imagine further that there is an 
immune system implemented as a ‘watcher’, whose 
antibodies match document features. ‘Interesting’ 
documents are those, whose features are matched by the 
immune system. 
When a user either explicitly or implicitly indicates 
interest in the current document, a “danger” signal is 
raised. This causes signal two to be passed, along with 
signal one, to antibodies matching any antigen, i.e. 
document feature, in the danger zone, i.e. this document. 
Stimulated antibodies become effectors, and thus the 
immune system learns to become a good filter when 
searching for other interesting documents. Interesting 
documents could be brought to the user’s attention (the 
exact mechanism is not relevant here). The important 
thing is that the user’s idea of an ‘interesting’ document 
may change over time and so it is important that the 
immune system adapts in a timely way to such a changing 
definition of (non-) self. 
Meanwhile, every document browsed by the user 
(whether interesting or not) will be presented to the 
antibodies as ‘signal one’. Uninteresting document 
features will therefore give rise to signal one without 
signal two, which will tolerate the autoreactive antibodies. 
The net effect is to produce a set of antibodies that match 
only interesting document features.  
As mentioned, this example is purely illustrative but it 
does show that ideas from the Danger theory may have 
implications for Artificial Immune System applications in 
domains where the relevance of ‘danger’ is far from 
obvious. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, the Danger Theory is not about the way 
Artificial Immune Systems represent data. Instead, it 
provides ideas about which data the Artificial Immune 
Systems should represent and deal with. They should 
focus on dangerous, i.e. interesting data. 
It could be argued that the shift from non-self to danger is 
merely a symbolic label change that achieves nothing. We 
do not believe this to be the case, since danger is a 
grounded signal, and non-self is (typically) a set of feature 
vectors with no further information about their meaning. 
The danger signal helps us to identify which subset of 
feature vectors is of interest. A suitably defined danger 
signal thus overcomes many of the limitations of self-non-
self selection. It restricts the domain of non-self to a 
manageable size, removes the need to screen against all 
self, and deals adaptively with scenarios where self (or 
non-self) changes over time.  
The challenge is clearly to define a suitable danger signal, 
a choice that might prove as critical as the choice of 
fitness function for an evolutionary algorithm. In addition, 
the physical distance in the biological system should be 
translated into a suitable proxy measure for similarity or 
causality in an Artificial Immune System. We have made 
some suggestions in this paper about how to tackle these 
challenges in a variety of domains, but the process is not 
likely to be trivial. Nevertheless, if these challenges are 
met, then future Artificial Immune System applications 
might derive considerable benefit, and new insights, from 
the Danger Theory. 
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